How can we ensure that private and other accommodation providers attract better guests, without apartment buildings regretting having tourists staying in them?

In brief

The debate over short-term lets in Budapest is currently framed as a choice between two extremes: ban them or leave things as they are. Both are the wrong answer, because both leave the same problem untouched. The problem is not that a tourist is staying in the building. It is that a third of the accommodation on offer has no operator anyone can contact.

There are four steps, and they must be taken in this order:

First, clean up the market.As long as a third of listings are invisible to the authorities, any further rules will affect only those who already comply.
Then address prices.A smaller, more transparent supply can sustain higher prices, which in themselves help filter the guest mix.
At the same time, improve how short-term lets operate in apartment buildings.An accessible host, swift action and consequences for guests who cause a disturbance.
Finally, measure whether there is still a problem at allthat needs to be addressed through restrictions.

In this article, we provide figures for all four steps and say where we found no evidence.

What quality tourism means — and what it does not

Quality tourism does not mean fewer guests. It means guests spend more in the neighbourhood, cause less damage in the building and have someone to turn to if something does go wrong. These three things depend not on a guest’s character, but on who lets the property and on what terms.

Two sets of measurements are needed to move beyond belief and assumption.

The first concerns how spending is distributed. There is Hungarian research on this: in the 2025/4 issue of Turizmus Bulletin, Karimov, Kamann and Gyurácz-Németh surveyed 103 guests in and around Budapest and at Balaton to examine how much of Airbnb and hotel guests’ spending outside their accommodation goes on local goods and services. The authors hypothesised that this share would be higher among Airbnb guests and found a statistically significant difference between the two groups. The sample is small, and the study measures proportions, not forint amounts, so we are not claiming that short-term accommodation guests spend more. We are saying that a greater share of their spending may stay with small businesses in the neighbourhood.

The second concerns accountability. Here, no external study is needed: we can measure it using our own database. That is the subject of the next section.

Step one: identify illegal operators

There are 14,997 short-term accommodation listings in Budapest on Airbnb and Booking. Of these, 4,950 are non-compliant: the mandatory NTAK number is not displayed, the number provided does not exist, or the listing uses someone else’s number.

That is 33.0 per cent of the accommodation on offer.(Source: BPDB, snapshot as at 1 October 2026. The data comes from comparing three public sources — the municipal accommodation register, the NTAK register and the listings — and can be recalculated at any time.)

The breakdown of the 4,950 is as follows: 2,825 listings give a number that does not exist in the register; 1,433 display no number at all; 365 use someone else’s number; 122 contain contradictory information; and 205 are operating in Terézváros with valid numbers, despite lettings being prohibited there.

We have taken a cautious approach. A further 1,373 listings have a number but no valid classification. We have not included them, because some operators may simply be awaiting classification.

Why start here?

Because every other rule affects only those who have registered in the first place. If a district says that no more than five per cent of flats may operate as accommodation, that rule applies to registered properties. Anyone who has never registered is unaffected by the limit, because their property is not included in the count.

Terézváros showed what happens when the order is reversed. Nine months after the ban took effect on 1 January 2026, there were 861 listings in the district, 653 of them non-compliant. Three-quarters of the accommodation still available after the ban was non-compliant. Operators who followed the rules closed. Those who did not are still open, and now have a tax advantage over lawful hosts in the neighbouring district.(Source: BPDB, 1 October 2026.)

Meanwhile, the district’s tourist tax revenue in the first half of 2026 was HUF 949.2 million, compared with HUF 1,228.9 million a year earlier — a fall of HUF 279.7 million. According to the Magyar Vendéglátók Ipartestülete, turnover at restaurants, cafés and bars in the VI. kerület fell by an average of 30 per cent in the first half of the year.

What we found in our own data — and what surprised us

It would be natural to assume that non-compliant listings offer cheaper accommodation because their operators do not pay tax.We measured it, and that is not the case.

After standardising for district and guest capacity, the median nightly price is €83.8 for compliant listings and €85.1 for non-compliant ones. The difference is negligible, and it does not even point in the direction we would expect. The unadjusted mean does show a substantial difference (€95.5 versus €123.2), but that is entirely due to a few exceptionally expensive listings: the threshold for the top five per cent is €206.6 among compliant listings and €350.2 among non-compliant ones, while the middle of the two distributions is virtually identical.

We also checked each district separately to make sure the standardisation was not concealing anything. There are eight districts with at least fifty listings in each group. The difference between the medians is sometimes positive and sometimes negative, but always just a few euros. In Erzsébetváros, which has the largest sample (1,892 compliant and 746 non-compliant listings), the two medians are€74.1 and €73.9— virtually identical. Even where the difference is greatest, it does not consistently point in one direction: the median for non-compliant listings is €6.5 higher in Belváros, but €5.4 lower in Ferencváros and the XIII. kerület. There is therefore no consistent price difference.

The implication of this finding matters:the illegal operator does not undercut the market; they charge the same price and keep the tax they have not paid.Guests gain nothing by booking non-compliant accommodation. They only lose protection if something goes wrong.

The same analysis revealed two things we had not been looking for, both directly related to quality. Average occupancy is 71.9 per cent for compliant listings and 65.1 per cent for non-compliant ones, using the same standardisation for district and guest capacity. Operating lawfully is therefore not a competitive disadvantage. Among compliant listings, 51.3 per cent are run by Superhosts, compared with just 34.0 per cent of non-compliant listings; average ratings are 4.775 and 4.689 respectively.

Analysis: BPDB, snapshot as at 1 October 2026, active Budapest Airbnb listings (5,422 compliant and 2,659 non-compliant listings with pricing data). Standardisation means we compared the two groups within categories defined by district and guest capacity, then weighted the results to match the composition of the compliant group. The difference therefore does not arise because the two groups operate in different places or comprise differently sized properties. Limitation: this covers Airbnb only and is a snapshot at a single point in time.

Step two: price as a filter

Once the market has been cleaned up, we can turn to something the industry rarely discusses openly: raising nightly rates. There are two separate claims here. We distinguish between them deliberately, because there is evidence for one but not the other.

The first claim: cleaning up the market raises prices for compliant accommodation.There is evidence for this — more than one set of figures, in fact.

San Francisco introduced mandatory registration in September 2017, and in January 2018 the platform removed some five thousand unregistered listings — half the available supply. A peer-reviewed study (Bibler, Teltser and Tremblay,Real Estate Economics, 2025) found that, compared with neighbouring unregulated cities, booking prices rose by 3.3 per cent, available supply fell by 20–27 per cent, and the remaining supply became less commercial in character. The study period ran from June 2016 to May 2019.

Scotland introduced a nationwide licensing system in October 2022. According to an analysis by the University of Glasgow’s Urban Big Data Centre, nightly rates rose in both Edinburgh and Glasgow, even after adjusting for inflation. Meanwhile, the number of available listings fell sharply, but the number of booked listings barely changed. The researchers concluded that part-time hosts left the market while professional operators remained. Study period: the same six-month period in 2021 and 2023.

Both cases show the same mechanism, and both involvedcleaning up the market, not a ban.That distinction is crucial to our proposal.

The second claim: higher prices attract better-behaved guests.That is our experience as operators, and it is what we observe: large groups on short weekend trips, looking for the cheapest bed, account for a large share of noise complaints.But we cannot support this with figures, so we do not present it as fact.We looked for evidence and found none: neither academic nor official sources measure the relationship between price levels and complaints from neighbours. The closest evidence concerns a change in the composition of supply — the operators who remain are more professional — not guest behaviour. Anyone using this argument is relying on an assumption and should say so explicitly.

In our own market, however, we can measure the other side of the question, and we have an answer.

The Terézváros ban created a natural experiment: a substantial block of accommodation was removed from the market from one month to the next. Using official monthly NTAK market data, we examined what happened in Budapest’s other districts during that period.

In Budapest, excluding the VI. kerület, in July–September 2026 compared with the same three months of the previous year:

Private accommodation: the average rate rose from HUF 29,964 to HUF 31,992, an increase of 6.8%. Guest nights fell by 2.5%.
Other accommodation: the average rate rose from HUF 31,682 to HUF 33,374, an increase of 5.3%. Guest nights rose by 5.8%.
Hotels: the average rate fell from HUF 47,747 to HUF 45,051, a decrease of 5.6%. Guest nights rose by 4.1%.

Hotels serve as a control group here: the same city, period, inflation and demand, but unaffected by the Terézváros ban. During this period, average hotel rates fell, while rates for private and other accommodation rose. As supply contracted, prices rose rather than fell.

Analysis: monthly NTAK market data from BPDB; average rates weighted by guest nights; July–September 2025 and 2026; Budapest districts excluding the VI. kerület. Limitation: there is considerable variation between months (private accommodation rates changed year on year by +21.6 per cent in July, −7.1 per cent in August and +12.1 per cent in September). We therefore report the figure for all three months together, not the most favourable one. Hotels are an imperfect control because they serve a different guest mix. We do not claim that the withdrawal of accommodation in Terézváros caused the change. We claim that, while supply was contracting, private accommodation rates rose rather than fell.

This is also the strongest argument for the order we propose. Cleaning up the market would remove 4,950 listings from the available supply — a shock broadly comparable in scale to the one Terézváros caused in a single district. The difference is thata clean-up removes non-compliant operators, while a ban removes those who follow the rules.The market effect is similar, but the impact on society is the opposite.

We need to state one thing plainly here; otherwise, the argument above is open to challenge:we found no evidence that removing non-compliant accommodation would, by itself and without any price effect, improve quality.Improvements in quality come through two channels: the presence of an accountable operator and price-based filtering. The two must not be confused.

Step three: improve how short-term lets operate in apartment buildings

Conflicts in apartment buildings almost always begin with the same words: “There was no one to call.” The greatest grievance is not the noise, but the sense of helplessness. Someone standing in the corridor at two in the morning does not need statistics. They need a phone number that someone will answer.

We propose four measures, each of which costs less than the consequences of a single district-wide ban.

1. Host accountability and contact details

Hosts operating accommodation should be required to display their contact details somewhere visible in the building and provide them in writing to the building manager. Residents could then report problems involving guests directly, and the operator would have to act without delay.

This is the cheapest and quickest measure on the list to introduce. It requires no new authority or IT development and does not restrict anyone’s operations. It does one thing: identifies who is responsible.

It is also measurable, which matters: without that, the rule would exist only on paper. Either the building manager has the contact details on record or they do not. Checking requires one question.

There is a precedent: since 2020, hosts in New South Wales have been required to notify neighbours and the owners’ corporation that they let the property short-term, and to provide an emergency contact.

One point does need clarifying, however.As the overview of Hungarian law below shows, an apartment building cannot currently enforce this requirement itself: when registering accommodation, the municipal clerk cannot take the building’s organisational and operational rules into account. This measure should therefore not be left to apartment buildings. It needs to become a condition of accommodation registration, where the clerk already has a means of enforcing it.

2. A security service to support hosts

A small operator cannot provide a round-the-clock response service, and that is not a matter of unwillingness: half of all accommodation belongs to operators with just one property.(Source: district municipal registers, BPDB compilation, 1 October 2026. Of all operators, 97.2 per cent have no more than three properties.)

The answer is not to make everyone provide their own round-the-clock service. It is to establish a shared security service with a central customer-service line, which hosts can use on a subscription basis. This model gives residents one number that is always available, while making a service affordable for hosts who could not fund it alone.

The funding is straightforward: if cleaning up the market raises rates for compliant accommodation, part of the additional revenue can be used for precisely this purpose. This is where the pricing argument and the apartment-building argument meet.

3. Consequences for disruptive guests

Today, the worst consequence for a disruptive guest is a bad review. The host and the building’s residents are left bearing the cost.

We propose that breaches of house rules should also carry a financial consequence for guests. Three things are needed together: the house rules and the amount of any penalty must appear in the listing, in the booking terms and on a notice displayed at the accommodation. If any one is missing, the penalty can be disputed afterwards.

This proposal cannot work for non-compliant accommodation even in principle, which again supports the order we propose: if a property is not registered, there is no identifiable operator against whom to enforce anything.

4. Further proposals

The following are not our own ideas, but measures already in use elsewhere. We list them on the basis of the sources in the international section below:

Require noise sensors.These devices measure decibel levels without recording sound, so they do not intrude on guests’ privacy. An alert notifies the operator immediately, before a neighbour complains. They have been mandatory for commercial short-term accommodation in New Orleans since July 2023. We should note that figures circulating about the effectiveness of sensors come almost exclusively from manufacturers; we found no independent city-level measurements.
Link the maximum number of guests to the property’s stated capacity, and make the limit enforceable.In Budapest’s inner districts, around a tenth of listings accommodate at least seven people: 16.7 per cent in the VI. kerület, 11.8 per cent in the IX., 11.1 per cent in the VIII., 10.8 per cent in the VII. and 8.0 per cent in the V.(Analysis: BPDB, snapshot as at 1 October 2026, active Airbnb listings.)Large-capacity accommodation is not inherently a problem, but it generates a disproportionate share of complaints from apartment buildings.
A cap on concentration within each apartment building.Not at district level, but building by building: only a specified proportion of flats in a stairwell could operate as accommodation. This would limit the burden on residents, not restrict the market as a whole.

We emphasise that several of these measures are restrictions. We are not saying restrictions must never be imposed. We are saying they need to apply to operators the authorities can see — and that first means making the third of available accommodation that is currently invisible visible.

What we can learn from places that have already taken action

The Budapest debate often proceeds as though this question were being raised for the first time. It is not, and the experience abroad is clear enough to be worth examining.

Where bans were introduced

In September 2023, New York effectively banned short-term letting of entire homes. Available supply fell by more than 90 per cent: some 38,500 properties disappeared, leaving around 3,000. If the effect on housing was going to be measurable anywhere, it should have been there.

It was not. Median rent in Manhattan reached a record high in July 2025, and available market data indicates that rents rose faster precisely in the neighbourhoods that had previously had the most short-term accommodation.

Hotel prices, however, did rise. According to a peer-reviewed study published in 2025, the average daily rate at New York hotels rose by $14–19 per night, and hotel-industry revenue increased by $2.1–2.9 billion in the first eighteen months after the ban, while the number of room nights sold barely changed. Almost all the additional revenue therefore came from higher prices. Over the same period, restaurant turnover fell by around 10 per cent compared with similar large US cities.

Studies of bans in Santa Monica and Chicago show the same pattern: the number of listings falls dramatically, but the effect on rents is not statistically significant.

This matters to the debate in Hungary, because the most common counterargument is that tourists will simply stay in hotels instead. The available evidence says otherwise: according to a 2022 study published in the American Economic Review, between 49 and 70 per cent of short-term accommodation guests would not have booked a hotel, rising to 87 per cent at peak times. Experience in Terézváros points the same way: in the first quarter of 2026, hotels absorbed less than a quarter of the guest nights lost from the district’s private accommodation (Office of the National Assembly, Infojegyzet 2026/6, based on KSH data).

Where registration was required

San Francisco introduced mandatory registration in 2017, not a ban, and long-term house prices there fell measurably. In other words, where there was a measurable result, it came from making the accommodation supply transparent, not banning it.

Berlin relaxed restrictions introduced two years earlier in 2018 and, in return, made it mandatory to display a registration number.

The difference is no accident. A ban reaches the accommodation that was already visible — and therefore already compliant. Registration, by contrast, brings the invisible portion into view. Only then can anything else be regulated.

European Union Regulation 2024/1028 moves Member States in this direction: it requires a common registration system and data sharing between platforms and authorities. It is important, however, to state precisely what it requires: platforms must make reasonable efforts and carry out random checks on the validity of registration numbers, not verify every listing individually.

Responses to problems in apartment buildings

International practice here is less uniform than it is on registration, and measured outcomes are less often available. The measures below appear in several cities. What they have in common is that they prescribe how accommodation is operated rather than restricting its existence.

A host who can be contacted — as a requirement

New South Wales has had a mandatory industry code of conduct since December 2020. Hosts must be reachable outside working hours, provide an emergency contact andnotify neighbours and the owners’ corporationthat they let the property short-term. Complaints may be made not only by guests or hosts, but also by neighbours and the owners’ corporation.

Several US cities also specify response times. In Nashville, the responsible person’s name and phone number must be displayed prominently in the property, and that person must answer the phone 24 hours a day, seven days a week. In Austin, the contact person must live in one of the nearby counties and respond to emergencies within two hours. Palm Springs requires a response by phone within fifteen minutes and an in-person response within thirty minutes.

Palm Springs is also the only city we found that regularlypublishes complaint figures. During the festival weeks in 2025, there were 33 complaints and 3 fines; in a full, typical month, there were 60 reports and 8 fines. The city’s own conclusion is that festival weekends are no worse than other weekends. This kind of transparency is what makes a debate evidence-based.

Consequences for rule-breakers

In New South Wales, two serious breaches of the code within two years lead to a five-year ban and inclusion on a public exclusion register. In Galveston, three substantiated violations within twelve months lead to revocation of the permit.

Here, though, we must also acknowledge an uncomfortable fact.The New South Wales exclusion register has been operating since August 2022, yet its official website still stated in September 2026 that it contained no people and no properties. Deterrence may be working, but anyone citing this system as an example of an effective sanction must mention that zero alongside it.

The warning from London is starker still. The annual ninety-night cap has been in place since 2015. In Westminster, 9,389 homes were let for longer than this in 2024, yet in the same yearonly two enforcement notices in totalwere issued. The rule exists; enforcement does not.

The same will be true of proposals in Hungary. A rule without the capacity to enforce it delivers a measured result of zero.

Noise sensors

Since 1 July 2023, every commercial short-term accommodation property in New Orleans has been required to have a noise-level monitor. Applications must also include plans for managing noise, safety and waste. This is the clearest requirement we found that can be verified from an official source.

The figures circulating about sensors’ effectiveness, however, come almost without exception from manufacturers. We found no independent before-and-after study carried out by a city. We therefore recommend the device but do not quote the associated marketing figures.

What is worth copying: tougher rules tied to a measurable threshold

Amsterdam did not introduce a quota; it created a graduated system of restrictions. The annual limit on nights available for letting fell from sixty to thirty and, from April 2026, will fall to fifteen in eight inner-city neighbourhoods. The trigger for tightening the rule is public and quantitative: it takes effect ifmore than thirty per cent of households in the neighbourhood report disruption caused by tourist lets.If the figure remains above thirty per cent at the next measurement, the next step is a temporary complete ban. That consequence was announced in advance.

This is the only example we found where the severity of the rules is determined not by a political cycle, but by measured conditions for residents. It would be the most transferable model for Budapest: first measure the actual extent of disruption, then set the level of intervention accordingly.

What Hungarian law currently permits — and what it does not

Some of these proposals cannot currently be implemented without changing the law. It is better to make that clear from the outset; otherwise, the debate remains abstract. The overview below is based on legislation currently in force, but it is not legal advice. A lawyer should be consulted before any substantive steps are taken.

Apartment buildings currently have limited powers

In Act CXXXIII of 2003 on apartment buildings,the word “accommodation” does not appear once.There is therefore no rule specifically addressing Airbnb in apartment buildings, whether prohibitive or permissive. Residents must rely on the general rules on use: a building’s organisational and operational rules set out how privately owned flats may be used and exploited, in keeping with the residential building’s purpose. Adopting or amending those rules requires a simple majority of all ownership shares — more than half of the entire building, not just those represented at the meeting.

There is a stronger tool, but it appliesonly to non-residential premises(shops and offices): the owners’ meeting may prohibit a change of use to protect the peace of residents, and its resolution must specify the disruptive conduct concerned. This cannot be applied to accommodation operating in a flat.

And here is the practical catch.When accommodation is registered, the municipal clerk cannot take the building’s organisational and operational rules into account; they cannot prevent registration. In other words, an apartment building may decide it does not want short-term lets, but the accommodation can still be registered, and enforcing the building’s decision requires court action. Residents cannot impose a fine themselves, either.

That explains why conflicts in apartment buildings can drag on for years. What is missing is not the will to act, but the means.

Municipal powers are narrower than many think

Under the authority granted by the Trade Act, a district council may specify by decreehow many daysin a calendar year a property may be used to provide accommodation services. That authority concerns the number of days. The Act does not expressly authorise a limit on the number of properties, a district-wide quota or a proportion per building, and we have not seen the legality of such measures decided at the highest judicial level.

Terézváros used this power when it set the number of permitted days at zero. In November 2025, the Kúria dismissed a challenge to the decree, so the zero-day rule stands under the current legal framework.

The strongest restriction currently in force expires at the end of the year

Today, the greatest restriction is not a district decree but a national rule:no new private or other accommodation may be registered within Budapest’s administrative boundaries until 31 December 2026.Even a change in the service provider for previously registered accommodation cannot be recorded.

This moratorium expires on 31 December 2026. Accommodation-provider associations have requested a one-year extension, but at the time of writing we are not aware of any government decision to extend it or replace it. This deadline is why the debate needs to happen now, not next spring. If no decision is made on what will replace the moratorium before it expires, the same market — one-third of which is currently non-compliant — will reopen on 1 January 2027, only we will have lost another year’s worth of data.

What we can offer

None of the proposals above can be implemented without the authorities and industry organisations. We can provide the following, immediately and free of charge.

To NTAK and the Magyar Turisztikai Ügynökség

Our methodology in full.Identifying non-compliant listings is based on comparing three public registers and sources. We will share a description of the method so that anyone can repeat the analysis and challenge it. A figure that cannot be reproduced is not a sound basis for policy decisions.
Regular market snapshotsbroken down by district: how many listings are active, what proportion are non-compliant, and how those figures change after measures are introduced.
Follow-up measurement.For any measure introduced, we will carry out a before-and-after analysis using the same method and the same sample. This is what is most conspicuously missing today: for most restrictions, no one has ever measured the results.

To Budapest City Council and the district councils

District-level databefore decisions are made, including an estimate of how proposed local rules would affect operators who are not currently on the register. This figure has been missing from every district decision so far.
A model for providing host contact detailsand accompanying template documents: what must be displayed, what must be given to the building manager and how compliance can be checked with one question.
A pilot.In apartment buildings where we operate accommodation, we will test the proposed measures and share what we learn — including if they do not work.

To industry organisations and apartment buildings

We will help establish the central security response serviceboth as an organiser and as one of its first subscribers. A service like this is viable only if many people use it, so someone has to make a start.
We will provide building managerswith practical guidance on what they can and cannot require of an accommodation operator. Some conflicts arise because this is currently unclear.

What we will not do

We will not publish names or publicly accuse anyone. Our aim is not to stigmatise individual operators, but to ensure the same rules apply to everyone. We will give the data to the authority empowered to act, not to the press.

We should also state one fact about our own operations; without it, the proposals above would ring hollow: of the active listings we manage,not one is non-compliant.(Analysis: BPDB, 1 October 2026.)We already meet the standard we are asking others to meet.

In summary

Quality tourism does not come from having fewer places to stay. It comes from having a person who can be contacted behind every one of them. First, we need to make the third of available accommodation that is currently invisible visible. Then we can discuss prices and limits, while improving how short-term lets operate in apartment buildings.

If we do it in the opposite order, lawful operators close, non-compliant ones remain, and the district loses both tax revenue and hospitality trade. This is not a hypothesis: we have already measured it in Terézváros.

Sources

Our own analyses (GuestGuru BPDB)

BPDB is compiled by comparing three public sources — district municipal accommodation registers, the NTAK register and platform listings — and can be recalculated at any time.

Market conditions, proportion of non-compliant listings and operator structure: snapshot as at 1 October 2026, using the same dataset published in GuestGuru’s public dossier on illegal operators.
Comparison of prices, occupancy and quality between compliant and non-compliant listings, standardised by district and guest capacity: snapshot as at 1 October 2026.
Distribution of guest capacity in the inner districts and compliance of our own portfolio: snapshot as at 1 October 2026.

Official Hungarian sources and domestic research

Karimov, A., Kamann, D.-J. F., Gyurácz-Németh P.: Tourists’ local spending habits in the Budapest and surrounding area and Balaton tourism regions: an exploratory study of spending beyond accommodation by Airbnb and hotel guests.Turizmus Bulletin, 2025/4.
Monthly NTAK market data broken down by district and category, July–September 2025 and 2026.
KSH visitor data for the VI. kerület, as reported in the Office of the National Assembly’s Infojegyzet 2026/6.
Act CXXXIII of 2003 on apartment buildings (Sections 17 and 18), current text, njt.jog.gov.hu.
Act CLXIV of 2005 on Trade, Sections 6/D(3) and 11/H (Budapest moratorium), current text.
Kúria decision Köf.5.023/2025/4 on the Terézváros decree, 11 November 2025.
Terézváros Municipal Decree 26/2024 (X. 31.), effective from 1 January 2026.
Magyar Vendéglátók Ipartestülete on hospitality turnover in the VI. kerület, first half of 2026.

International regulation and evidence

San Francisco: Bibler, Teltser and Tremblay on the effect of mandatory registration.Real Estate Economics53(4), 2025. Study period: June 2016–May 2019.
Scotland: Urban Big Data Centre, University of Glasgow, on the effect of licensing; the same six-month period in 2021 and 2023.
Amsterdam: mandatory registration in 2021 and changes in listing numbers according to municipal surveys; annual night cap and graduated restrictions, effective from 1 April 2026.
New York: Local Law 18 impact report, NYC Office of Criminal Justice, September 2025; hotel prices: European Journal of Political Economy, 2025.
Farronato and Fradkin on the relationship between short-term accommodation and the hotel market.American Economic Review, 2022.
Santa Monica: synthetic-control analysis by Chaves Fonseca (CEMFI), with data extending to July 2017.
New South Wales: mandatory code of conduct (December 2020) and exclusion register (August 2022), official NSW Fair Trading websites.
New Orleans: noise-monitoring requirement, nola.gov, effective from 1 July 2023.
Nashville, Austin and Palm Springs: contact-person and response-time requirements, official city websites; Palm Springs complaint statistics reported in the local press from the city’s weekly reports.
London: data on enforcement of the 90-night cap, Westminster City Council, 2024–2025.
Spain: the rule on apartment-building consent, Article 17.12 of the Ley de Propiedad Horizontal, as amended in 2025.

Quality tourism in Budapest’s accommodation